ABSTRACT Certificateless multi-receiver encryption/signcryption (CLME/CLMS) has become a research hotspot in the field of information security. Almost all of the existing CLME/CLMS schemes are constructed based on the bilinear pairing computation, a time-consuming operation, which makes their computational efficiency relatively low. Although there are some CLME schemes constructed on scalar point multiplications on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) instead of the bilinear pairing computation, too many scalar point multiplications involved still lead to the low computational efficiency. Therefore, there is still room for the CLME/CLMS schemes in efficiency. Motivated by these concerns, an efficient anonymous certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme is proposed with its security proved under the random oracle model. The proposed scheme is improved largely in computational efficiency by the idea that it is designed based on scalar point multiplications on ECC instead of the bilinear pairing and the number of scalar point multiplications on ECC is reduced as small as possible.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-receiver encryption/signcryption has been considered as an effective and promising way to achieve one-tomany secure communication. The first identity-based multireceiver encryption (MIBE) scheme was brought forward by Baek et al. [1] in 2005. Afterwards, in order to ensure the ciphertext's validity, combining MIBE with Zheng's signcryption [2] , Duan and Cao [3] proposed the first multireceiver identity-based signcryption (MIBS) scheme and gave the unforgeability security model at the same time. Since then, a large number of MIBS schemes [4] - [9] , which are suitable for network conferences, paid-TV system and ad-hoc networks, have been proposed.
With the penetration of the Internet in all aspects of our daily life, people are increasingly focusing on their own privacy. For example, when watching a paid-TV program, people may not want others to know the specific program that they are watching, which belongs to their own privacy. Based on this practical need, introducing the receiver anonymity to MIBE, Fan et al. [10] put forward the first anonymous MIBE scheme by utilizing Lagrange interpolating polynomial. Unfortunately, both Wang et al. [11] and Chien [12] later prove that Fan et al. ' s scheme fails to achieve the receiver anonymity as they have claimed. Afterwards, a new anonymous MIBS scheme was proposed by Pang and Li [13] , in which the concept of decryption fairness is used to describe the characterization and enhancement of the receiver anonymity, but the receiver anonymity is not achieved due to the use of Lagrange interpolating polynomial, either. To truly achieve the receiver anonymity, in 2014, Tseng et al. [14] proposed another anonymous MIBE scheme, in which the receiver anonymity is realized by a modular large prime polynomial and the method is considered as one of the most effective ways to achieve the receiver anonymity so far.
Nevertheless, there exits the terrible phenomenon that the number of the involved bilinear pairing operations grows linearly with the number of receivers in Tseng et al. ' s scheme, which leads to it extremely low in computational efficiency. To further improve efficiency, security and performance, there are a few following anonymous MIBE/MIBS schemes [15] - [19] proposed.
However, for schemes [10] - [19] above, there exists the key escrow problem, which is inherent in all ID-based schemes and means that the key generation center (KGC) could obtain the user's complete private key. Aiming at this problem, Al-Riyami and Paterson [20] put forward the certificateless public key cryptography, in which not only the key escrow problem in ID-based cryptography (IBC) is solved because the user's private key is generated by the user and the key generation center (KGC) together and KGC cannot obtain the user's complete private key, but also the advantage of no certificate in IBC is preserved, which marks the birth of a new cryptosystem, says the certificateless cryptosystem. Subsequently, many certificateless encryption/signcryption schemes [21] - [24] were proposed one by one. Selvi et al. proposed a certificateless multi-receiver signcryption (CLMS) scheme [25] in 2008 and its improved version [26] in 2009. Although it has been later proved by Miao et al. [27] that Selvi et al.'s scheme [26] cannot satisfy message confidentiality under external attacker's attack, it has raised the research upsurge on certificateless multi-receiver encryption/signcryption schemes. In 2005, Islam et al. [28] proposed an anonymous certificateless multi-receiver encryption (ACLME) scheme, which does not use the bilinear pairing operations but utilizes scalar point multiplications on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and makes an auspicious start in reducing the computational burden. However, the number of the involved scalar point multiplications on ECC remains to be reduced in Islam et al.' s scheme. At the same year, Hung et al. [29] proposed another ACLME scheme. Unfortunately, Hung et al.'s scheme still needs to be improved in efficiency as a result of the use of the bilinear pairing and map-to-point (MTP) hash function, another time-consuming operation. To improve Hung et al. ' s scheme in efficiency, a new ACLME scheme was proposed by He et al. [30] . Regrettably, in He et al.'s scheme, it is found that although the bilinear pairing and MTP hash operations are not utilized, the number of the involved scalar point multiplications on ECC is still big, which affects the scheme in computational efficiency.
Further pursuing efficiency and lightweight, other certificateless multi-receiver encryption (CLME) schemes [31] , [32] were proposed, successively. Nevertheless, although they are improved in encryption efficiency, the computation efficiency of their decryption process is bad, because the decryption process of scheme [31] utilizes the bilinear pairing and that of scheme [32] utilizes too many scalar point multiplications on ECC. Besides, it is worth noting that schemes [28] - [32] do not provide the sender with signature function, which is impossible to resist the attacker's forgery attack. At present, many certificateless multi-receiver (CLMR) schemes based on applications such as healthcare system [33] and IOT [34] have been proposed, yet they still remain to be improved in efficiency due to the use of the bilinear pairing. Besides, what are worth noting is that schemes [25] , [26] , [29] - [31] , [33] , [34] do not achieve decryption fairness and own partial private key verifiability, which fails them to avoid malicious KGC attacks.
To sum up, lots of CLME/CLMS researchers have been pursuing perfection in the computational efficiency, nevertheless, the computational performance of these schemes still remains to be improved. Motivated by those concerns, an efficient anonymous certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme without bilinear pairings is proposed, in which not only it is improved in efficiency by using scalar point multiplications on ECC instead of the bilinear pairing and limiting the number of the involved scalar point multiplications as small as possible, but also more security functions have been achieved such as decryption fairness, signature and partial private key verifiability. At the same time, it is proved that the proposed scheme satisfies message confidentiality, unforgeability and receiver anonymity under the random oracle model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The related hard problems, algorithm model and security models of the proposed scheme are given in Section II. In Section III, the proposed scheme is minutely described. Besides, Section IV makes an analysis of correctness and security about the proposed scheme. Then the comparison between the proposed scheme and the existing CLME/CLMS schemes in terms of efficiency and functions is given in Section V. Finally, Section VI makes a conclusion about this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will give the hard problems, algorithm model and security models related to our proposed scheme.
A. HARD PROBLEMS
We define that p is a large prime number, G p is the addition cycle group of points on ECC, Z * p is a nonzero multiplicative group based on p and P is one generator of G p . Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) and Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) will be given as follows: 1) CDHP: Given P, aP and bP ∈ G p , where a, b ∈ Z * p , computing abP is called a CDHP.
Definition 1: The probability advantage that CDHP can be solved by any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A is defined as
2) ECDLP: Given P and xP ∈ G p , where x ∈ Z * p , computing x is called ECDLP. Setup: With a security parameter η as input, KGC runs the algorithm to get the master key s and the system's public parameters Params, and publishes Params while saving s.
Set-Secret-Value: With his/her own identity information ID as input, the user runs the algorithm to get his/her own secret value v ID and secret value parameter V ID .
Extract-Partial-Private-Key: With the master key s, the system's public parameters Params, and the user's identity information ID and secret value parameter V ID as input, KGC runs the algorithm to get the user's partial private key y ID and partial public key D ID .
Set-Public-Key: With the system's public parameters Params, and his/her own identity information ID, partial private key y ID and partial public key D ID as input, the user runs the algorithm to get his/her own public key PK ID .
Set-Private-Key: With the system's public parameters Params, and his/her own identity information ID, partial private key y ID , public key PK ID and secret value v ID as input, the user runs the algorithm to get his/her own private key SK ID .
Anony-Signcryption: With the system's public parameters Params, a plaintext m, the authorized receivers' public key PK i and his/her own private key SK S as input, the sender runs the algorithm to generate the ciphertext C = AnonySigncryption (Param s, m, PK i , SK S ).
De-Signcryption: With the system's public parameters Params, the ciphertext C and his/her own private key SK i as input, every authorized receiver runs the algorithm to get the plaintext m = De-Signcryption (SK i , C, Paramss) and uses the sender's public key PK S to verify the plaintext's source.
C. SECURITY MODELS
The security models of the proposed scheme include message confidentiality, unforgeability and receiver anonymity. There are two types of adversaries called Type I adversary (A I ) and Type II adversary (A II ) respectively [20] in every security model. A I means a malicious user who does not know the master key s, but he/she is allowed to replace the user's public key, while A II means an honest-but-curious KGC who knows the master key s, but he/she is not allowed to replace the user's public key. The specific security models under different adversaries are shown as follows:
1) MESSAGE CONFIDENTIALITY
The message confidentiality of the proposed scheme is called the indistinguishability of certificateless signcryption against selective multi-receiver chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CLMS-CCA) [25] 
If for any A II under IND-CLMS-CCA, the probability advantage of winning Game 2 within time τ meets Adv IND-CLMS-CCA A II ≤ ε, the scheme is said to be (τ, ε)-IND-CLMS-CCA-II secure, where τ is the polynomial running time and ε is the non-negligible probability advantage.
2) UNFORGEABILITY
The unforgeability model of the proposed scheme is called the strong existential unforgeability of certificateless signcryption against selective multi-receiver, chosen plaintext attack (SUF-CLMS-CPA) [25] . SUF-CLMS-CPA against A I (SUF-CLMS-CPA-I) and SUF-CLMS-CPA againstA II (SUF-CLMS-CPA-II) will be described by Game 3 and Game 4, respectively.
Game 3 (SUF-CLMS-CPA-I): The game is the interaction between the challenger B and A I under SUF-CLMS-CPA, and the specific steps are shown as follows:
Setup: The step is the same as Setup in Game 1. Attack: A I asks B for the same adaptive queries as Phase 1 in Game 1, and B responds accordingly.
Forgery: A I forges a new ciphertext C * with a group of target identities L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n }and a plaintext m. If the ciphertext C * can be decrypted correctly by any receiver in L, A I wins the game. Otherwise, A I fails. But it should be noted that C * cannot be generated by the Anony-Signcryption query and other restrictions are the same as Phase 2 in Game 1.
Definition 6: If for any A I under SUF-CLMS-CPA, the probability advantage of winning Game 3 within time τ meets Adv SUF-CLMS-CPA A I ≤ ε, the scheme is said to be (τ, ε)-SUF-CLMS-CPA-I secure, where τ is the polynomial running time and ε is the non-negligible probability advantage.
Game 4 (SUF-CLMS-CPA-II): The game is the interaction between the challenger B and A II under SUF-CLMS-CPA, and the specific steps are shown as follows:
Setup: The step is the same as Setup in Game 2. Attack: A II asks B for the same adaptive queries as Phase 1 in Game 2, and B responds accordingly.
Forgery: A II forges a new ciphertext C * with a group of target identities L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n }and a plaintext m. If the ciphertext C * can be decrypted correctly by any receiver in L, A II wins the game. Otherwise, A II fails. But it should be noted that C * cannot be generated by the Anony-Signcryption query and other restrictions are the same as Phase 2 in Game 2.
Definition 7: If for any A II under SUF-CLMS-CPA, the probability advantage of winning Game 4 within time τ meets Adv SUF-CLMS-CPA A II ≤ ε, the scheme is said to be (τ, ε)-SUF-CLMS-CPA-II secure, where τ is the polynomial running time and ε is the non-negligible probability advantage.
3) RECEIVER ANONYMITY
The receiver anonymity model of the proposed scheme is called the anonymous indistinguishability of certificateless signcryption against selective multi-receiver, chosen ciphertext attack (ANON-CLMS-CCA) [28] . ANON-CLMS-CCA against A I (ANON-CLMS-CCA-I) and ANON-CLMS-CCA against A II (ANON-CLMS-CCA-II) will be described by Game 5 and Game 6, respectively.
Game 5(ANON-CLMS-CCA-I):
The game is the interaction between the challenger B and A I under ANON-CLMS-CCA, and the specific steps are shown as follows:
Setup: B runs this algorithm to generate the master key s and the system's public parameter Params, and then sends Params to A I while keeping s secret. Upon receiving Params, A I outputs a group of target identitiesL = {ID 0 , ID 1 }. ANON-CLMS-CCA (A I ) ≤ ε, the scheme is said to be (τ, ε)-ANON-CLMS-CCA-I secure, where τ is the polynomial running time and ε is the non-negligible probability advantage.
Game 6(ANON-CLMS-CCA-II):
The game is the interaction between the challenger B and A II under ANON-CLMS-CCA, and the specific steps are shown as follows:
Setup: B runs this algorithm to generate the master key s and the system's public parameter Params, and then sends Params and s to A II . Upon receiving Params and s, A II outputs a set of target identities L = {ID 0 , ID 1 }. ANON-CLMS-CCA (A II ) ≤ ε, the scheme is said to be (τ, ε)-ANON-CLMS-CCA-II secure, where τ is the polynomial running time and ε is the non-negligible probability advantage.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The participants of the proposed scheme consist of KGC, the sender S and a set of authorized receivers, R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n , where n is the number of authorized receivers decided by the sender. And the specific scheme includes Setup algorithm, Key Extract algorithm, Anony-Signcryption algorithm and De-Signcryption algorithm, shown as follows:
A. SETUP ALGORITHM Setup algorithm is run by KGC to generate the master key and the system's public parameters, shown as follows:
1) With a security parameter η as input, KGC randomly chooses a prime integer p (q ≥ 2 k , k is a long integer.), generates an elliptic curve E defined on finite field F p , and chooses an additive cyclic group G p on E and its generator P.
2) KGC randomly chooses an integer s ∈ Z * p as the master key and computes P pub = sP as system's public key.
3) KGC chooses five secure hash functions:
KGC chooses a symmetric encryption function E k and the corresponding decryption function D k (such as AES), where k is the symmetric key.
5) KGC publishes the system's public parameters
H 4 > and keeps the master key s secret.
B. KEY EXTRACT ALGORITHM
Key Extract algorithm is run by the user and KGC together to generate the user's public key and private key, shown as follows:
The user with the identity information ID i randomly chooses an integer v i ∈ Z * p , computes V i = v i P, and sends V i and his/her own identity information ID i to KGC through a public channel, where v i is the user's secret value and V i is the user's secret value parameter.
2) Extract-Partial-Private-Key Algorithm: Upon receiving V i and ID i from the user, KGC randomly chooses an integer d i ∈ Z * p and computes
Then, KGC sends y i to the user through a secure channel, and sends D i to the user through a public channel, where y i is the user's partial private key, and D i is the user's partial public key.
3) Set-Public-Key Algorithm: Upon receiving y i and D i from KGC, the user checks whether the equation y i P = D i + P pub holds. If yes, the user accepts the partial private key y i and the partial public key D i , and computes
as his/her own public key. Then, the user sends PK i to KGC for publication. Otherwise, the user rejects the partial private key y i and the partial public key D i .
4) Set-Private-Key Algorithm: The user computes
as his/her own private key.
C. ANONY-SIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM
With the system's public parameters Params, the sender's private key SK S and the plaintext m as input, the sender S chooses a set of receivers with their identities information L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n } and signcrypts m as follows:
1) Compute Q i = PK i + P pub , where i = 1, 2, . . . , n; 2) Randomly choose an integer w ∈ Z * p , and compute
3) Randomly choose an integer ξ ∈ Z * p and compute the polynomial ξ , a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 , W ); 5) Compute h −1 to make it satisfy the equation hh −1 ≡1mod p, and compute z = h −1 (SK S + w)(mod p); 6) Generate the ciphertext C =< J , W , z, h, a 0 ,  a 1 , . . . , a n−1 > and broadcast it to receivers.
D. DE-SIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM
Upon receiving the ciphertext C =< J , W , z, h, a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 >, each receiver can decrypt C with his/her own private key SK i and the system's public parameters Params as follows:
. . , a n−1 , W ), and check whether the equation h = h holds. If yes, the receiver continues with the following steps. Otherwise, the receiver rejects m and exits the de-signcryption process.
5) The receiver obtains the sender S's public key PK S , and judges whether the equation hzP = H 1 (ID S , PK S )(PK S + P pub ) + W holds. If yes, the receiver accepts the plaintext m and exits the de-signcryption process. Otherwise, the receiver rejects m and exits the de-signcryption process.
IV. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY PROOFS A. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
Theorem 1: The verification of the user's partial private key in Key Extract Algorithm is correct.
Proof: The correctness of the user's partial private key verification is guaranteed by the establishment of the equation y i P = D i + P pub , and the deduction that the equation holds is shown as follows:
Through the above derivation, it can be seen that the equation y i P = D i + P pub holds. As a result, the verification of the user's partial private key in Key Extract Algorithm is correct.
Theorem 2: The De-Signcryption algorithm is correct.
Proof: The correctness of De-Signcryption algorithm is guaranteed by establishments of equations h = h and hzP = H 1 (ID S ,PK S )(PK S + P pub ) + W , and deductions that these two equations hold are shown in the following 1) and 2), respectively. 1) For every receiver R i , with the ciphertext C, he/she has F i = SK i W and α i = H 2 (F i , W ). Then, with α i , he/she can compute ξ = f (α i ), and then get k = H 3 (ξ ) and m||ID S = D k (J ). Finally, he/she has h = H 4 (m||ID S , ξ , a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 , W ). So, the equation h = h holds.
2) When decrypting out the sender's identity ID S , the receiver can obtain the sender's public key and has
Through the derivations of 1) and 2) above, it can be seen that equations h = h and hzP = H 1 (ID S , PK S )(PK S +P pub )+ W hold. As a result, the De-Signcryption algorithm is correct.
B. SECURITY PROOFS
Based on security models in Section II, the specific security proofs of the proposed scheme are shown below. In Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, we shall prove that the proposed scheme can achieve IND-CLMS-CCA-I/II security. In Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, we shall prove that the proposed scheme can achieve SUF-CLMS-CPA-I/II security. In Theorem 7 and Theorem 8, we shall prove that the proposed scheme can achieve ANON-CLMS-CCA-I/II security. Proof: Assume that an adversary A I can attack the IND-CLMS-CCA security with a non-negligible probability advantage ε and ask the challenger B for a series of queries under the random oracle model. Given a set of elements < P, aP, bP>, the challenger B computes abP to solve CDHP by interacting with the adversary A I within a time bounded polynomial. And the interaction between the challenger B and the adversary A I is shown as follows:
Setup: B runs this algorithm to generate the master key s = a ∈ Z * p and the system's public parameter Params =< F p , E, 
2) H 1 hash query: With tuples < ID j , V j > and <ID j , PK j > as input, A I asks B for H 1 hash query. Upon receiving the query, B checks whether the tuples < ID j , V j , θ j > and <ID j , PK j , δ j > are in list L 1 . If yes, B returns θ j and δ j to A I . Otherwise, B randomly chooses two integers θ j , δ j ∈ Z * p and returns them to A I . Meanwhile, B updates tuples < ID j , V j , θ j > and <ID j , PK j , δ j > in list L 1 .
3 
and then updates tuples
<ID j , SK j , PK j , v j , y j > in list L C and < ID j , V j , θ j > in list L 1 , respectively. b) If ID j =ID i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, B randomly chooses two integers y j , v j ∈ Z * p , sets V j = v j P, computes D j = y j P- P pub , PK j = D j + H 1 (ID j , V j )V j and SK j = H 1 (ID j ,PK j )(y j + H 1 (ID j , V j )v j ) (modp),
2) Set-Secret-Value query: A I asks B for Set-Secret-Value query on ID j . Upon receiving the query, B checks whether the tuple <ID j , SK j , PK j , v j , y j > is in list L C . If yes, B returns v j to A I . Otherwise, B performs key query to obtain the tuple <ID j , SK j , PK j , v j , y j >, and returns v j to A I .
3) Extract-Partial-Private-Key query: A I asks B for ExtractPartial-Private-Key query on ID j . Upon receiving the query, B responds as follows: 
7) Anony-Signcryption query: A I asks B for AnonySigncryption query on the plaintext m and the identity information ID S . Upon receiving the query, B judges whether ID S = ID i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. If yes, B performs SetPrivate-Key query to obtain the private key SK S , generates the ciphertext C, and returns C to A I . Otherwise, B performs as follows: a) Randomly choose an integer w ∈ Z * p , and compute W = wP, F j = wH 1 (ID j , PK j )(PK j + P pub ) and α j = H 2 (F j , W ), where j = 1, 2, . . . , n; b) Randomly choose an integer ξ ∈ Z * p , and construct the polynomial ξ , a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 , W ); d) Randomly choose an integer z ∈ Z * p ; e) Return the ciphertext C =< J , W , z, h, a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 > to A I . Through the discussion above, it is concluded that during de-signcryption queries, H 4 hash could provide a valid ciphertext, so the probability that a valid ciphertext is rejected is not greater than q 4/ 2 k . Since A I asks B for q d designcryption queries during the attack process, the probability advantage that B decrypts the ciphertext successfully is ε d ≥ ε − q 4 q d / 2 k . And during the guess process, H 2 hash satisfies CDHP, so the correct probability that B computes abP is at least ε g = 2 / nq 2 . Therefore, the probability advantage that B can solve CDHP by interacting with the adversary 
2) Set-Secret-Value query: A II asks B for Set-Secret-Value query on ID j . Upon receiving the query, B responds as follows:
. . , n, B checks whether the tuple <ID j , SK j , PK j , v j , y j > is in list L C . If yes, B returns v j to A II . Otherwise, B performs key query to obtain the tuple <ID j , SK j , PK j , v j , y j >, and returns v j to A II .
3) Extract-Partial-Private-Key query: A II asks B for Extract-Partial-Private-Key query on ID j . Upon receiving the query, B checks whether the tuple <ID j , SK j , PK j , v j , y j > is in list L C . If yes, B returns y j to A II . Otherwise, B performs key query to obtain the tuple <ID j , SK j , PK j , v j , y j > and returns y j to A II . 4) Set-Public-Key query: A II asks B for Set-Public-Key query on ID j . Upon receiving the query, B checks whether the tuple <ID j , SK j , PK j , v j , y j > is in list L C . If yes, B returns PK j to A II . Otherwise, B performs key query to obtain the tuple <ID j , SK j , PK j , v j , y j > and returns PK j to A II . 5) Set-Private-Key query: A II asks B for Set-Private-Key query on ID j . Upon receiving the query, B responds as follows:
. . , n, B checks whether the tuple <ID j , SK j , PK j , v j , y j > is in list L C . If yes, B returns SK j to A II . Otherwise, B performs key query to obtain the tuple <ID j , SK j , PK j , v j , y j > and returns SK j to A II . 6) Anony-Signcryption query: The step is the same as Anony-Signcryption query in Theorem 3.
7) De-Signcryption query: The step is the same as De-Signcryption query in Theorem 3.
Challenge: A II randomly chooses a pair of plaintext < m 0 , m 1 > with equal length, and sends them to B. Upon receiving < m 0 , m 1 >, B randomly chooses a bit β ∈ {0, 1} and generates the ciphertext C * with the chosen plaintext m β as follows:
, where Y = K + P pub and i = 1, 2, . . . , n; b) Randomly choose an integer ξ ∈ Z * p and construct the polynomial
Phase 2: A II asks B for the same queries as Phase 1, but it should be noted that A II cannot perform De-Signcryption query on C * .
Guess: A II guesses a bit β * . If β * = β holds, A II wins the game, and B outputs abP = F i -W i as the solution to CDHP. Otherwise, B outputs ''failure''. Through the discussion above, it is concluded that during de-signcryption queries, H 4 hash could provide a valid ciphertext, so the probability that a valid ciphertext is rejected is not greater than q 4/ 2 k . Since A II asks B for q d designcryption queries during the attack process, the probability advantage that B decrypts the ciphertext successfully is ε d ≥ ε − q 4 q d / 2 k . And during the guess process, H 2 hash satisfies CDHP, so the correct probability that B computes abP is at least ε g = 2 / nq 2 . Therefore, the probability advantage that B can solve CDHP by interacting with the adversary A II is
where τ s is the time of an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation.
Theorem 5: SUF-CLMS-CPA-I. Under SUF-CLMS-CPA, if there is an adversary A I who can win Game 3 in polynomial running time τ with a non-negligible probability advantage ε (A I can ask for the same queries as A I in Theorem 3), the challenger B can solve CDHP by interacting with the adversary A I in time τ ≤ τ + (2q c + 2q a ) O (τ s ) with a nonnegligible probability advantage ε ≥ (ε − q a 2 k ) 2, where τ s is the time of an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation.
Proof: Assume that an adversary A I can attack the SUF-CLMS-CPA security with a non-negligible probability advantage ε and ask the challenger B for a series of queries under the random oracle model. Given a set of elements < P, aP, bP>, the challenger B computes abP to solve CDHP by interacting with the adversary A I within a time bounded polynomial. The interaction between the challenger B and the adversary A I is shown as follows:
Setup: The step is the same as Setup in Theorem 3. Attack: A I asks B for the same adaptive queries as Phase 1 in Theorem 3.
Forgery: A I forges a new ciphertext C * =< J , W , z, h, a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 > with a group of target identities L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n } and a plaintext m. If equations h = h and hzP = H 1 (ID S , PK S )(PK S + P pub ) + W hold, the ciphertext C * is forged successfully. And setting PK i = b −1 PK i and F i = b(PK i +P pub ), B computes F i = PK i +abP, and outputs abP = F i -PK i as the solution to CDHP. Otherwise, B outputs ''failure''.
Through the discussion above, it is concluded that during q a signcryption queries, its successful probability advantage is at least ε a = ε − q a / 2 k . And during the forger process, the correct probability that B computes abP is at least ε g = 1 / 2 . Therefore, the probability advantage that B can solve CDHP by interacting with the adversary A I is ε ≥ ε a ε g = (ε − q a 2 k ) 2 within running time τ ≤ τ + (2q c + 2q a ) O (τ s ), where τ s is the time of an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation.
Theorem 6: SUF-CLMS-CPA-II. Under SUF-CLMS-CPA, if there is an adversary A II who can win Game 4 in polynomial running time τ with a non-negligible probability advantage ε (A II can ask for the same queries as A II in Theorem 4), the challenger B can solve CDHP by interacting with the adversary A II in time τ ≤ τ + (3q c + 2q a ) O (τ s ) with a nonnegligible probability advantage ε ≥ (ε − q a 2 k ) 2, where τ s is the time of an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation.
Proof: Assume that an adversary A II can attack the SUF-CLMS-CPA security with a non-negligible probability advantage ε and ask the challenger B for a series of queries under the random oracle model. Given a set of elements < P, aP, bP>, the challenger B computes abP to solve CDHP by interacting with the adversary A II within a time bounded polynomial. The interaction between the challenger B and the adversary A II is shown as follows:
Setup: The step is the same as Setup in Through the discussion above, it is concluded that during q a signcryption queries, its successful probability advantage is at least ε a = ε − q a / 2 k . And for the forger process, the correct probability that B computes abP is at least ε g = 1 / 2 . Therefore, the probability advantage that B can solve CDHP by interacting with the adversary A II is ε ≥ ε a ε g = (ε − q a 2 k ) 2 within running time τ ≤ τ +(3q c + 2q a ) O (τ s ), where τ s is the time of an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation. Proof: Assume that an adversary A I can attack the ANON-CLMS-CCA security with a non-negligible advantage ε and ask the challenger B for a series of queries under the random oracle model. Given a set of elements < P, aP, bP>, B computes abP to solve CDHP by interacting with the adversary A I within a time bounded polynomial. The interaction between the challenger B and the adversary A I is shown as follows:
Setup: B runs this algorithm to generate the master key s = a ∈ Z * p and the system's public parameter Params =< Through the discussion above, it is concluded that during de-signcryption queries, H 4 hash could provide a valid ciphertext, so the probability that a valid ciphertext is rejected is not greater than q 4/ 2 k . Since A I asks B for q d designcryption queries during the attack process, the probability advantage that B decrypts the ciphertext successfully is ε d ≥ ε − q 4 q d / 2 k . And during the guess process, H 2 hash satisfies CDHP, so the correct probability that B computes abP is at least ε g = 1 / nq 2 . Therefore, the probability advantage that B can solve CDHP by interacting with the adversary 
, where Y = K + P pub and i = e, 2, 3, . . . , n; b) Randomly choose an integer ξ ∈ Z * p and construct the polynomial Through the discussion above, it is concluded that during de-signcryption queries, H 4 hash could provide a valid ciphertext, so the probability that a valid ciphertext is rejected is not greater than q 4/ 2 k . Since A II asks B for q d de-signcryption queries during the attack process, the probability advantage that B decrypts the ciphertext successfully is ε d ≥ ε − q 4 q d / 2 k . And during the guess process, H 2 hash satisfies CDHP, so the correct probability that B computes abP is at least ε g = 1 / nq 2 . Therefore, the probability advantage that B can solve CDHP by interacting with the adversary A II is ε ≥ ε d ε g ≥ (ε − q d q 4 2 k ) nq 2 within running time τ ≤ τ +(3q c + 3q d ) O (τ s ), where τ s is the time of an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation.
V. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AND FUNCTIONAL COMPARISON
In order to evaluate our scheme, we will make comparisons between our scheme and the existing ones [25] , [26] , [28] - [33] in terms of computational efficiency and functions, because these schemes [25] , [26] , [28] - [33] are based on certificateless cryptography and they are similar to our scheme in some functions.
A. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
For ease of analysis, we define some symbols in TABLE 1, and the corresponding data are from [28] . It is worth noting that we only consider these operations' time defined in TABLE 1, and other operations' time is not considered because their runtime can be negligible compared with that of operations defined in TABLE 1.
The comparisons of computational efficiency between our scheme and these schemes [25] , [26] , [28] - [33] in signcryption/encryption and de-signcryption/decryption are shown in TABLE 2 .
From TABLE 2, we can see that compared with schemes [25] , [26] , [28] - [33] , our scheme is the highest in computational efficiency in terms of signcryption/encryption process. In de-signcryption/decryption, our scheme is more efficient than schemes [25] , [26] , [29] , [31] - [33] , but more inefficient than schemes [28] , [30] . The reason is that our scheme has the step to verify the message source, but these schemes [28] , [30] do not.
B. FUNCTIONAL COMPARISON
The comparison of functions between our scheme and these schemes [25] , [26] , [28] - [33] is shown in the following TABLE 3.
From TABLE 3, we can see that only the scheme [28] and our scheme meet decryption fairness, which ensures that all authorized receivers have the same ability to decrypt the received ciphertext, while schemes [25] , [26] , [29] - [33] do not. In addition, in order to protect the receivers' privacy, schemes [29] , [30] , [33] and our scheme achieve the receiver anonymity, which means that no one except the sender knows the authorized receivers' identities. However, schemes [25] , [26] , [28] , [31] - [32] do not take the receiver anonymity into account, which reveals the receivers' identities in their ciphertext directly. Schemes [28] , [32] and our scheme possess the partial private key verifiability, which prevents the malicious KGC from producing fake partial private key to deceive users. Nevertheless, because the partial private key verifiability is unavailable in schemes [25] , [26] , [29] - [31] , [33] , they have no ability to prevent the malicious KGC's attack. Schemes [25] , [26] and our scheme realize the signature function to ensure message's reliability, which avoids the situation that the attacker impersonates the sender's identity to send the message. But schemes [28] - [33] do not consider the function, and it is possible for the attacker to personate the sender's identity to do something bad. In short, compared with schemes [25] , [26] , [28] - [33] , our scheme has more functions, and is more secure and more suitable for practical applications.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an efficient anonymous certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme without bilinear pairings. Compared with existing CLME/CLMS schemes, the proposed scheme not only is high in computational efficiency, because the bilinear pairing and MTP hash function are not used and the number of scalar point multiplications on ECC is limited as small as possible, but also has more security functions such as decryption fairness, partial private key verifiability and signature. It has been proved to be secure in message confidentiality, unforgeability and receiver anonymity under the random oracle model. Therefore, whether in efficiency, functions, or in security, the proposed scheme is more in line with practical needs in application.
